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Abstract 
Adding sustainability to the conditions of perfect competition (PC) results in a 
meaningful benchmark, especially in the context of pursuing sustainability as a policy 
goal. On this basis, some standard explanations involving the comparisons with 
imperfect competition can be questioned. But, importantly the recognition of 
sustainability besides the standard conditions of PC provides the basis for expositing 
voluntary environmental stewardship. 
 





A central tenet in microeconomics is that the perfectly competitive market 
equilibrium dictates the maximization of net benefits. This equilibrium further 
coincides with a well-functioning system of private property rights. But the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium is seldom evident because of imperfectly competitive market 
structures and the absence of markets themselves. Environmental goods and services 
(EGS) are clear examples of absent markets because of their intangible nature. Such 
absent markets are often cited as prime causes of resource misallocation and the 
resulting losses of sustainability of EGS; [Mäler and Vincent (2003)]. The standard 
approaches in environmental economics to deal with such issues are: 
 
 Development of methods of valuation (and measurement) so that EGS can be 
included in market analyses and market failures could be corrected; for 
example see Sinden and Worrell (1979); Randall (1981); Knetsch (1994); 
Mäler and Vincent (2003); or 
 
 Assignment of property rights of (selected) EGS to private entities in the 
expectation that a markets capable of maximizing net social benefits would 
eventuate; for example see Randall (1981); Quiggin (1993) and Mäler and 
Vincent (2003). 
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That is, the corrective measures in environmental economics are “Market-Centric” 
implying that the perfectly competitive market equilibrium may also coincide with the 
incidence of sustainability. The main aim of this paper is to argue that such 
coincidence is unlikely and that the benchmark of Perfect Competition (PC) should be 
revised to include sustainability as an explicit condition besides the standard ones, 
namely anonymity, homogeneity, perfect information, perfect mobility and full 
employment. The bench mark should then be appropriately renamed Perfect 
Competition and Sustainability (PCS).  
 
The distinction between PC and PCS is considered the in the next section. This is 
followed by an illustration of how some of the standard expositions offered in the 
context of comparing PC with imperfect competition could markedly vary when PCS 
is introduced as the benchmark. In this instance a monopoly is considered as the case 
of imperfect competition. It is further possible to argue that the adoption of PCS as a 
benchmark could render the recognition of voluntary environmental stewardship as a 
policy option. 
 
2. PERFECT COMPETITION AND SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Sustainability can be defined as the perpetual flow of EGS despite the utilization of 
environmental capital (KN) stocks that generates them; [Costanza et al. (1997), Mäler 
and Vincent (2003). That is, some threshold level of KN stocks (sinks and sources) 
should be perpetually retained. Just the same way as PC provides a benchmark basis 
for economic analyses, PCS, with the added condition of sustainability, provides a 
benchmark basis for the analytics of environmental economics. One could argue that 
the unique conditions of the PCS benchmark are such that the imbalances imposed on 
KN could be restored through either natural processes or through voluntary 
stewardship. For example the anonymity condition is such that any contaminating 
emission could be small enough to not exceed the assimilative capacity of KN. At the 
same time, if the condition of perfect information encompasses KN as well as the 
knowledge of the requirements to maintain the perpetual flow of EGS from KN, then 
it is possible to argue that individuals would voluntarily control their extractions and 
emissions. For example, the much celebrated work of Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and 
Solow (1974) reveal the feasibility of a permanent flow of consumption despite the 
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constraints of exhaustible resources. They of course allow for substitutions between 
exhaustible resources and reproducible resources. The important point is that, even if 
Dasgupta-Heal-Solow did not explicitly revise the PC benchmarks, their assumptions 
were near enough to the PCS benchmark that is addressed here. That is, whilst 
anonymity could ensure that the magnitudes of withdrawals to be small, perfect 
information (and foresight) could prompt the choice of renewable KN over non-
renewable KN.  
 
If KN is perfectly sustainable, then the withdrawal of EGS from it could not entail an 
opportunity cost. As an example consider the case of a small wine-maker who 
operates on a river bank. The wine-maker draws water from the river and then 
discharges the residues of the wine making process into the river. The volume of 
withdrawal is such that it does not affect the hydrology of the river. Further, if the 
river is capable of assimilating the residues and retaining its eco-system properties 
without the wine-maker having to treat the residues, then the wine-maker does not 
incur an opportunity cost for using the river. The river displays a state of perfect 
sustainability. Alternatively, consider the case when the residues have to be treated 
prior to their discharge into the river because the river is unable to assimilate the 
residues without treatment. In this case the river retains its properties and its 
sustainability, but, has imposed has imposed an opportunity cost on the wine-maker.  
 
The distinction between PC and PCS lies then in the adoption (if necessary) of actions 
that would always render KN sustainable. The net result is that the size of net benefit 
in the context of PCS will be always smaller than that observed in the context of PC. 
Such a result could stem from the actions of both consumers as well as producers. 
Consumers could in their awareness of sustainability choose modest patterns of 
consumption whilst producers would bear higher marginal costs to protect KN assets. 
Both sets of actions represent forms of environmental stewardship prompted chiefly 
by perfect information.  
 
Consider Figure-1. The upper panel represents the perfectly competitive market for a 
specific commodity, whilst the lower panel explains the formation of unwanted 
emissions (E) that are associated with the quantity of output (Q) produced. ES 
represents the level unwanted output that the KN sinks can tolerate after allowances 
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have been made for the utilization of all markets. The recognition of ES differentiates 
the market equilibrium and sustainability conditions for PC and PCS as illustrated in 
Figure-1: 
 
PC: Demand (fD(Q) = Supply fS(Q))  [(Q*, P*) and (E = E* > ES)]  (1) 
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This result might seem very similar to that of internalizing an externality. However, 
the binding configuration for PCS is (ES, QS). Several permutations for (fDS(Q)) and 
(fSS(Q)) would be possible for achieving compliance with (ES, QS). Perfect 
information could make producers adopt known technologies that limit market output 
to QS whilst consumers armed with the same knowledge could also reduce their 
demand; and so on. The determination of (PS) will rest some specific production 
technology and consumption pattern within the bounds of (ES, QS). That is, the same 
way as the invisible hand supposedly guides the emergence of (Q*, P*) in the context 
of PC, the invisible hand – in the context of PCS - now armed with perfect 
information about KN, the future, and the requirements of other markets for utilizing 
KN sinks, will guide the emergence of (ES, QS, PS). 
 
The preference relations for emissions (E) and output (Q) in the context of the binding 
configuration in PCS, namely (ES, QS), can be explained as follows. Given the basic 
knowledge concerning ES, two sets of emission quantities are identifiable. These are: 
 )EE(e S1   and  )EE(e S2  . The conditions of PCS would dictate that  21 ee 
. This preference relation in turn will dictate the preference relation for two sets of 
output quantities. That is,  )QQ(q S1   and  )QQ(q S2  , where  21 qq  . This 
implies that the domains of utility maximization would be smaller in the context of 
PCS than PC. Further implication is that in the event such domains need to be 
extended, the innovation would primarily involve the search for technologies that 
would reduce the size of (dfE(Q)/dQ) and shift fE(Q) to the right. 
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(Figure-1 about here) 
 
The equilibrium in PCS will be such that a perpetual permanent net benefit (NB) with 
a present value (PV) as defined below is always feasible: 
 


















     (4) 
 
In (4) r represents the social rate of discount. In the context of PCS it is possible to 
argue that the discount rate (r) could tend to zero; then, {PV(NB) → ∞}. 
 
3. PC and PCS Vs MONOPOLY 
 
The comparison of PC with monopoly in standard texts, (Frank 2008, Pindyck and 
Rubenfeld 2008), do highlight the case of a deadweight loss that unfolds with a 
monopoly relative to PC. Standard texts often relegate environmental issues to 
sections dealing with public goods and externalities.  
 
Consider first the equilibrium in the context of monopoly as determined by the 
equality between marginal revenue and marginal cost, namely (QM, PM). This 
equilibrium is likely to result in a lower level of emission EM compared to E* that 
would prevail in PC. This is illustrated in Figure-2. This inference can be misleading 
on at least two counts. First, following the foregoing argument, the actual 
comparisons should be made with PCS and not PC. Second, even the comparison with 
PC could be misleading because it is unrealistic assume that the monopolist will 
employ the same marginal cost, namely {fS(Q) = MC} as the aggregate of a collection 
of small anonymous firms. If endowed with a greater degree of economies of scale, 
then the monopolist’s MC (labeled as MCM in Figure-2) could be more cost-effective. 
Then, the quantity-emission outcome could be higher and the so called deadweight 
loss smaller. Should the economies of scale be more significant, it is plausible for QM1 
to approach Q* or even exceed it and likewise for EM1 and E*. This possibility can be 
illustrated as follows. Let the demand and supply functions in the context of PC be 
respectively: (P =  – Q) and (P =  + Q). Suppose that the transformation of PC to 
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P  and (   < ). For QM1 to exceed Q* the following inequality 
should be feasible: 
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(Figure-2 About here) 
 
Since the inequality in (5) is feasible, as long as (   < ) and ( > 1), the possibility 
EM1 exceeding E* is also feasible. 
 
The comparison with PCS, however, could present a different picture. Note that the 
binding configuration in PCS is (ES, QS). Therefore, transforming the PCS context 
into an unregulated monopoly, that displays economies of scale, raises the possibility 
of higher levels of (E, Q) relative to (ES, QS). That is, there is a stronger case for the 
inequality in (5) in the context of PCS than in PC. 
 
(Figure-3 About here) 
 
As indicated, the recognition of sustainability as a condition warrants the recognition 
of (E-Q) space for KN and EGS besides the usual (Q-P) space that deals with market 
analysis. Such consideration would also prompt the various permutations of feasible 




The implications of the foregoing simple analysis are at least three fold. First, in the 
sphere of applied economics and policy analysis, PC has served as an important 
benchmark – especially in the shadow pricing literature dealing with project appraisal 
and cost-benefit analysis. The main argument in this paper is that PCS would prove to 
be a better benchmark because it would facilitate the choice of decisions that would 
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satisfy the criteria for sustainability. For example consider the stimulus measures that 
were hurriedly mobilized in the wake of the recent global financial crisis. Very little 
attention was paid to the importance of sustainability. In fact many of the measures 
introduced would seriously compromise the possibility of sustainability. Had PCS 
been firmly registered as the benchmark in economics, for starters, the global 
financial crisis (for that matter any such crisis) might not have surfaced. Even if it did, 
the response measures would have readily embraced modesty and the adoption of 
what environmental scientists label “closed-loop” production systems, namely those 
that do not pose additional burdens on KN sinks; for example see Benyhus (1997) and 
Thampapillai (2008, 2009). 
 
Second, the recognition PCS prompts the reassessment of comparisons with imperfect 
market organizations such as monopoly. As illustrated in the previous section, within 
an unregulated context, monopolies, if able to exploit economies of scale, can expand 
output beyond the limits dictated by PC and PCS and hence compromise the 
possibilities of sustainability. 
 
Finally and more importantly, the introduction of PCS as a benchmark enables the 
exposition of voluntary stewardship as a potential measure towards sustainability. The 
notion of stewardship is not readily found within the economics policy literature 
barring perhaps Frank’s (2003) foray into the economics of altruism. Voluntary 
stewardship inevitably ushers in modesty in favor of extravagance. The distinction 
between extravagance and modesty is inevitably murky. Nevertheless the recognition 
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